Monday, October 5, 2009

Blame the Dead Pilots?

Blame the Dead Pilots?
By Jamie McIntyre Monday, October 5th, 2009 12:37 pm
Posted in On Media, Readings and Reviews
Whenever there is a major aviation accident, it usually turns out there is a series of factors that contribute to the cause, any one of which could have changed the outcome.  As safety investigators weigh those factors, they tend to settle on the final, often fatal, mistake.   Except when there’s a clear case of mechanical malfunction, it often comes down to “blaming the dead pilots.”   But it’s also important to understand how the pilots were put in a position to make that mistake, and to consider whether inadequate training, lack of safety equipment, or other pressures were equally at fault.  In other words, were good pilots set up to fail?
That is the impetus behind the quixotic quest of Congressman Walter Jones (R-NC), who has for years been trying to clear the names of two Marine Corps pilots who were blamed for the deadly crash of a V-22 Osprey in 2000, a crash that almost claimed the entire V-22 program among its casualties.  Read Jone’s Letter Here
The April 8, 2000 accident in Marana, Arizona was blamed on “human factors,” which has been widely interpreted in the news media as “pilot error.”   The proximate cause was that the pilots, following another V-22’s lead, descended too quickly, putting the plane into a “vortex ring state” while in helicopter mode.   The loss of lift caused the fiery crash, which killed all 19 Marines on board, including the pilots: Maj. John A. Brow, 39 and Maj. Brooks S. Gruber, 34.
At the time, many critics (cynics?) thought the Marine Corps was anxious to blame the pilots to avoid the perception that the V-22, with sophisticated computer-assisted avionics, was too “unforgiving” to be flown safely in combat conditions.  That perception could well have doomed the troubled program.  But experts I talked to blamed general overconfidence of V-22 crews, and the fact that some pilots routinely ignored the “placarded” limit for the rate of descent of 800 feet-per-minute.   The pilots on the mishap aircraft were going down at least three times as fast.
That clearly was the final mistake that caused the crash, but in appealing to the Navy to revise the record, Congressman Jones has reviewed the official investigations and public records and talked with other aviation experts and come to a different conclusion: namely that the fatal factor was “the aircraft’s lack of a Vortex Ring State (VRS) warning system as well as the pilots’ lack of critical training regarding the extreme dangers of VRS onset in the Osprey.”  In a “Memorandum for the Record” he has requested be placed in all official records relating the accident, Rep. Jones writes, “Lieutenant Colonel Brow and Major Gruber and their families are dishonored by the assertion that the aircrew was in any way responsible for this fatal accident.”
REQUEST DENIED
I understand the intent of Jones’ crusade.   The cause of the accident was far more complex than simply “the pilots screwed up.”   But accident investigations are done in a way that is designed to totally insulate them from any outside factors, including sympathy for the families or political pressure.  And that’s how it should be.
I think the official response that Jones got from Rear Adm. A. J. Johnson, Commander of the Naval Safety Center, was exactly right.  Rear Adm. Johnson wrote, “All safety investigations are conducted solely to determine root causes and identify corrective actions, not to assign blame or document accountability.  Aviation safety investigations are conducted by a team of specialized investigators, including at least one professional aviation safety investigator. They are exceptionally adept at what they do, and they have access to all of the expertise and resources within the Department of the Navy in reaching their conclusions. Their process, which is tried and true after more than 50 years of experience, is closed to outside influences. It would be inappropriate to alter the official safety investigation report by appending your Memorandum for the Record.”
But that doesn’t mean the pilots are being depicted fairly in media accounts as the sole cause of the accident.  Training was a factor, as evidenced by the emphasis post-accident training has put on understanding and avoiding vortex ring state, and subsequent improvements in the flight software that helps the pilots avoid the problem.
For a dispassionate view, I asked my old pal Rick Whittle, a former Dallas Morning News defense correspondent, for his take.  Rick has written extensively on the V-22, and has a book coming out next year [The Dream Machine, the Untold History of the Notorious V-22 Osprey]
Here’s what he e-mailed me:
“Before I investigated the crash for my book, I thought the Marines were using a euphemism when they called the cause “human factors,” but I’ve changed my mind. I interviewed a number of Marines who were on the mission that night – including four pilots who were in other Ospreys and the copilot and crew chiefs of the Osprey that led the way into Marana. What they told me, and other evidence I gathered, makes it clear that a lot of things contributed to that crash, and they didn’t all happen in the cockpit of the Osprey that went down. For that matter, they didn’t all happen that night. “Human factors” may be about as close as you can come to describing those causes in two words.
In any event, “pilot error” makes it sound like John Brow and Brooks Gruber were cowboys taking reckless chances, and that wasn’t the case. They were two of the best pilots in the Marine Corps.
They were coming down too fast when they went into vortex ring state, but they were flying wingman for another Osprey and following it in to Marana. The first Osprey descended too fast, too, partly because its pilots got distracted during the mission and started their descent into the airfield late. They were part of a big exercise that night, and there were a lot of other things going on.
I tell the full story in the book.”
Sounds like a great read.
Tags: , ,
Share |
0
AJM · 193 weeks ago
ONLY IN CASES IN WHICH THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO DOUBT WHATSOEVER SHOULD DECEASED AIRCREW BE FOUND NEGLIGENT”

AP3207 – RAF Manual of Flight Safety, Chapter 8, Appendix G, page 9.
/web/20130618002051/http://www.chinook-justice.org/

Here in the UK there has been a similar controversy regarding RAF Chinook pilots posthumously blamed for a fatal crash in 1994.

'The evidence against two special forces pilots who were blamed for crashing an RAF Chinook helicopter into the Mull of Kintyre, killing all 29 on board, was too thin to reach such a damning verdict, campaigners for the servicemen claim today'.
/web/20130618002051/http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article6407986.ece
+1
Tregonsee 49p · 193 weeks ago
These are very old numbers, ca 1975, and for military aviation. At that time, if even one crew member survived to testify, even a non-pilot such as a flight engineer or loadmaster, the likelihood of finding crew error as the primary cause was half of what it was if all aboard were killed. With the greater use of black boxes on military aircraft, the ratio is lower today, but there is still an discrepancy.
0
brusty · 193 weeks ago
I think we have to be careful with the term "human error". In a sfaerty investigation this is not interchangeable with "pilot error". Human error can be improper training or education for the pilots that is out of their hands and precedes the accident.

Vortex ring state is an annomally of rotor-wing flight that does not occur in fixed-wing flight. The human error of the accident could be placing two experienced fixed-wing aviators in the same ****pit with limited rotor experince. In that case it is not the pilot error, but a breakdown in training on much higher levels.

Human error should never excuse others or the military aviation community from making needed changes.
0
TheSwabbie · 192 weeks ago
Human error could mean that bugs from the Flight Engineers lunch flew in the eyes of both the pilot and copilot causing temporary blindness and distraction enough to loose control of the aircraft.. that COULD be construed as human error (as stupid and silly as it sounds). I've flown (on P3s) with some great Naval Avaitors who on a number of occasions did some magnificent flying in some difficult circumstances and situations.. Fire in engines when you are 500+ miles north of Iceland - Over the cold North Atlantic.. in the Arctic Circle. No room for error there - and we got home... DRY.
0
Alan Diehl, Ph.D. · 191 weeks ago
Congressman Jones' efforts are commendable. As explained in my book "Silent Knights: Blowing the Whistle on Military Accidents and Their Cover-Ups," a senior Pentagon official tried unsuccessfully to get me assigned to that investigation "to keep the Marines honest." I was a former NTSB and USAF aviation psychologist who had long campaigned to get officials to systematically examine the underlying causes of "human error." Needless to say the Marines refused that request, just like they'll do with the Congressman's efforts.
0
luke · 187 weeks ago
It is allways blamed on human error when a computer is involved,look at all th F/A-18 crashes never has one been blamed on the plane.even when it first came out and when using night vission in flight not all of the insterments could be read like say the altimator and yes it could not be read and we had 2 planes go into the ground at night both pilots were wearing night vison at the time but they were blamed and not the plane or equipment.
Posted by at No comments:

Thursday, October 1, 2009

Propaganda or Plain Ol’ PR?

Propaganda or Plain Ol’ PR?
By Jamie McIntyre Thursday, October 1st, 2009 6:39 pm
Posted in On Media
The folks at the Pentagon Press office are being raked over the hibachi again for alleged propaganda mongering, and the guy with the bulls-eye on his back is a nondescript career civil servant named Bryan Whitman.
The charge is that the Pentagon, back during the dark Rumsfeld days, conspired to dupe the American people, by wooing hapless retired military officers to knowingly spread lies and disinformation about the war in Iraq in return for coveted access.
It’s a premise that won a Pulitzer Prize for the New York Times reporter David Barstow last year, and has resurfaced on rawstory​.com, which seems dismayed to learn that the President has not fired every civil servant who ever worked for Rumsfeld.

You can read both the original New York Times story, and the Raw Story version online.
Senior official in Bush domestic propaganda program remains Obama’s Pentagon spokesman — rawstory​.com, Sept 2009
Behind TV Analysts, Pentagon’s Hidden Hand — New York Times, April, 2007
Both portray the program as a sinister and cynical effort to provide briefings to military analysts in a ham-fisted attempt to turn them into pitchmen for the Pentagon’s official line that the war was being won.
It all sounds pretty sordid, the way it’s laid out.  But like a prosecutor’s opening argument, the evidence is all presented in the most damning light, and not much credence is given to any opposing perspective.
There is, however, another less sinister view.  Namely, that the Pentagon’s press office was just doing its job in trying to get its side of the story out.  That the veteran military commanders who were given briefings used their judgment and experience to decide how much of the Pentagon’s spin to swallow, and that the private briefings, far from being some covert propaganda program, were in fact not all that much different from the backgrounders with senior officials routinely provided top journalists who are also seen as in a position to influence public opinion.  (And who some also feel were patsies for the Pentagon, but that’s another story.)
That is what GAO pointed out when it found last July that the Pentagon’s public affairs activities did not violate the federal  publicity or propaganda prohibition,  “Federal agencies have a responsibility to inform the public about their activities and programs, explain their policies, and disseminate information in defense of those policies or an administration’s point of view.”
[Department of Defense—Retired Military Officers as Media Analysts]
But to subscribe to the more benign view that this was good old-fashioned public relations, not pernicious propaganda, one would have to give some of the people involved the benefit of the doubt, and these days no one is predisposed in that direction.
I know Bryan Whitman, a former Special Forces soldier, who as a civilian has been an apolitical advocate for whomever is serving as defense secretary.  Over the years I found him to be cautious, and credible in his dealings with the press.  The office he oversees is the part of the public relations arm of the Pentagon, and so it cannot be considered an unbiased source of unvarnished information.  Any reporter knows that, as does any retired military officer worth his stars.
I also know some of the military analysts in question.  The best ones don’t rely on their out-of-date experience, or private Pentagon briefings.  I would cite as a an example retired Air Force Maj. Gen. Don Shepperd, who worked for CNN when I was Senior Pentagon Correspondent.  Gen. Shepperd went to briefings, and even took some trips when they were offered to hear and see firsthand what the commanders were saying.  But he also worked his sources like any good reporter, looking for context, and reality checks.  And when he shared his views on the air, they were HIS views, the result of his own fact-finding and critical thinking.
Now not all the military analysts covered themselves in glory, to be sure. From the transcripts of the meetings, we can see some did seem a little too eager to salute smartly and rally support for the Pentagon position.  And some of those may have simply honesty agreed with the Pentagon’s view at the time.  But retired military officers who moonlight as TV analysts have an occupational hazard similar to Pentagon news reporters: whenever they attempt to put things in context and suggest theer may be more that one possible interpretation of the events, they leave themselves vulnerable to charge they are drinking the Kool-Aid.
Retired Army Col. Ken Allard, author of the book “Warheads: Cable News And the Fog of War” about military analysts calls the original New York Times story ” badly distorted, incomplete and intellectually dishonest.” Warheads: Cable News And the Fog of War, Ken Allard
In an email to me he wrote:
“I keep coming back to the SO WHAT? test, which is basic to this story and utterly dismissed by Barstow while serving the greater good of the NYT/Democratic/Pulitzer agenda. While we military analysts were given access to PNT officials, so too were many other reporters and other policy-relevant strap-hangers. …But there was never any harm to the public interest and arguably some positive benefits. Bottom Line: No one controlled what we said on-air — not even our own studios and certainly not Don Rumsfeld’s Pentagon! And that was the principal thesis of WARHEADS. Look it up! ”
The easy way to avoid that is to be unfailingly critical, in other words, unfailing unfair.  The best way to avoid any appearance of conflict of interest is full disclosure.  If generals want to inoculate themselves against allegations they are doing the Pentagon’s dirty work, they should make sure to disclose what, if any, special access they received.  The pubic already sees former military officers as “generally” pro-military and pro-war.
So was this propaganda, or just plain old PR?  Here’s what the GAO concluded:
“Clearly, DOD attempted to favorably influence public opinion with respect to the Administration’s war policies in Iraq and Afghanistan through the RMOs [Retired Military Officers]. However, … based on the record before us in this case, we conclude that DOD’s public affairs outreach program to RMOs did not violate the prohibition. We found no evidence that DOD attempted to conceal from the public its outreach to RMOs or its role in providing RMOs with information, materials, access to department officials, travel, and luncheons. Moreover, we found no evidence that DOD contracted with or paid RMOs for positive commentary or analysis. Consequently, DOD’s public affairs activities involving RMOs, in our opinion, did not violate the publicity or propaganda prohibition.”
Tags: , , ,
Share |
+1
CharlesHouston 81p · 193 weeks ago
Most of the unrealistic views have always come from people who were NEVER in the military. Someone who has experienced combat comes away with a deep respect for the need to prepare, and does not casually advise sending people into that situation. I am reminded of Gen Senseki, who relied on his decades of military experience to give advice to Don Rumsfeld.
0
David M · 193 weeks ago
The Thunder Run has linked to this post in the blog post From the Front: 10/02/2009 News and Personal dispatches from the front and the home front.
0
Dan d'Errico · 193 weeks ago
AS with every part of the civilian government, it's either a spin doctoring or what actually occured. Very little of what occured will get out if it has to approved by the SecDef first. Especially if it appears to blacken his tenure in the pentagon If the retired military is brought in to say it's true or not, remember they're retired. A not in the "loop any more" General is like a not in the

"loop any more" seargent. But if you're going to report the Pentagon stories, no matter what they are, Get into the loop and get your opinion with facts aired in print or televised. I hope that alot more people read this blog and understand that at least one reporter is willing to investigate an item or more to the point where he'll be trusted to give an unbiased story on the air.
0
Zathras · 193 weeks ago
Perhaps this is just a coincidence, but I noticed on the first page of Barstow's NYT story the following:

Kenneth Allard, a former NBC military analyst who has taught information warfare at the National Defense University, said the campaign amounted to a sophisticated information operation. “This was a coherent, active policy,” he said. As conditions in Iraq deteriorated, Mr. Allard recalled, he saw a yawning gap between what analysts were told in private briefings and what subsequent inquiries and books later revealed.

“Night and day,” Mr. Allard said, “I felt we’d been hosed.”

Is this the same guy quoted here?
0
primetime · 192 weeks ago
It is only Propaganda when you are in disagreement with it or those who disseminate it. Brian and his counterparts are normal people trying to do a good job. Some are idiots and time servers waiting to translate their experience into money on the outside and some are committed public servants.
Posted by at No comments:
Subscribe to: Posts (Atom)